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The Tug-of-War with Employment Information: Does
Louisiana Revised Statutes. 23:291 Really Help Employers
Stay Out of the Mud?*
I. INTRODUCTION
Louisiana employers are involved in a tug-of-war, with employment'
information serving as the rope. On one side, the former employer is clinging
to employment information because of the fear of defamation litigation. On the
other side, the prospective employer, who is aware of the recent growth in
negligent hiring claims, is grasping for the same employment information.
Former employers have been winning this battle by simply taking their rope and
going home.
In response to the threat of defamation litigation, some employers have
adopted a "no comment" policy regarding employment references, in which no
information at all is given about an employee or a former employee.' Some
employers have chosen to give only "name, rank, and serial number" references,
which give only information such as the dates of employment and salary.2
Valuable information concerning the quality and character of an employee is
withheld when employers refuse to give more substantive employment references.
When the free flow of this type of information is impeded, prospective
employers are unable to carefully and intelligently choose employees, and they
are increasingly vulnerable to litigation for the torts committed by their
employees through theories such as vicarious liability and negligent hiring.'
For example, Employee is employed by Employer #1 in a supervisory
position. Employer #1 knows that Employee has a terrible temper and does not
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
The author would like to thank Professor William R. Corbett, Rosemary Neal Hawkland
Associate Professor of Law and Interim Vice Chancellor, Louisiana State University, for his help and
suggestions as faculty advisor on this paper.
Copyright 1998, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
I. See, e.g., Roberts S. Adler & Ellen Pierce, Encouraging Employers to Abandon Their "No
Comment" Policies Regarding Job References: A Reform Proposal, 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1381
(1996); Jane Eikleberry, The Lawyer as Employer. Job References a Legal and Management
Paradox, 32 Ariz. Atty. 20 (Oct. 1995); D. Scott Landry & Randy Hoffman, Walking the Fine Line
on Employee Job Reference Information, 43 La. B.J. 457 (1996); John Bruce Lewis et al.,
Defamation and the Workplace: A Survey of the Law and Proposals for Reform, 54 Mo. L. Rev. 797
(1989); Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, Employer (Ir)rationality and the Demise of
Employment References, 30 Am. Bus. L.J. 123 (1992); Bradley Saxon, Flaws in the Laws Governing
Employment References: Problems of "Overdeterrence " and a Proposal for Reform, 13 Yale L. &
Pol'y Rev. 45 (1995); Janet Swerdlow, Note, Negligent Referral: A Potential Theory for Employer
Liability, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1645 (1991).
2. See sources cited supra note I.
3. Saxon, supra note I, at 50-51; Adler & Pierce, supra note 1, at 1423-24.
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work well with others. In fact, Employer #1 subsequently discharges Employee
because he assaulted a customer. Employer #2 calls Employer #1 to ask for an
employnent reference of Employee. Employer # 1, fearing defamation litigation,
gives only his dates of employment and salary level. Unaware of the true reason
for termination, Employer #2 hires Employee. Soon after, Employee assaults a
customer, and Employer #2 is sued under theories such as vicarious liability
and/or negligent hiring.
This policy is detrimental not only to prospective employers, but also to
former employers and good employees Former employers benefit from
employment references, because employment references can act as an incentive
to motivate employees to work well to gain a favorable reference.' Employment
references also benefit hard-working employees who deserve the benefit of a
positive reference.6 Other than the former employer who benefits by not risking
defamation litigation, the only party that benefits from the restriction of
employment information is a problem employee.
Therefore, employers in Louisiana, who are in need of employment
information, have been faced with the problem of the need for employ-
ment information at a time when former employers are hesitant to give
this information. Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 is the Louisiana
Legislature's attempt to solve this problem.' To encourage former
employers to disclose employment information, the statute provides
protection from civil liability for torts, such as defamation, to those
employers who disclose employment information.' By enacting this statute,
Louisiana joined a large number of states which have enacted similar civil
4. Saxon, supra note I, at 49, 51.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. 1995 La. Acts. No. 632, effective Aug. 15, 1995. Senate Bill No. 688 by Senator
Brinkhaus was proposed to a Senate committee for the purpose of enabling employers to control the
quality of their workforce, as well as violence in the workplace. Minutes of the Civil Law and
Procedure Committee Meeting (May 29, 1995). The enacted statute provides as follows:
La. R.S. 23:291. Disclosure of employment related information; presumptions; causes of
action; definitions
A. Any employer that, upon request by a prospective employer, provides accurate
information about a current or former employee's job performance or reasons for
separation shall be immune from civil liability and other consequences of such disclosure
provided such employer is not acting in bad faith. An employer shall be considered
acting in bad faith only if it can be shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
information disclosed was knowingly false and deliberately misleading.
B. Any prospective employer who reasonably relies on information pertaining to an
employee's job performance or reasons for separation, disclosed by a former employer
shall be immune from civil liability including liability for negligent hiring, negligent
retention, and other causes of action related to the hiring of said employee, based upon
such reasonable reliance, unless further investigation, including but not limited to a
criminal background check, is required by law.
(Section C., containing definitions of words and phrases, is omitted.).
8. La. R.S. 23:291(A) (Supp. 1997).
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immunities or "shield laws" for employers who provide employment references.9
However, Louisiana's version of the "shield law" is distinct from the other shield
laws in that it also includes immunity from the torts associated with hiring for
employers who reasonably rely on the employment information given by a
former employer.'"
Different torts have created this problem concerning employment referenc-
es." In this article, the two main conflicting torts, defamation and negligent
hiring, will be examined to determine the extent of liability.employers face and
the protections afforded to employers in Louisiana before the passage of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291.
Next, the language and scope of Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 will be
evaluated. This article will then show that the language of the statute limits it
so that it.only affords, if any, a small increase in the protection already afforded
by the jurisprudence.
The possible future implications of the statute will also be considered. The
statute could have the unintended consequence of imposing an affirmative duty
on prospective employers to obtain employment information. 2 As information
would seem to be more readily available because of the immunity given to
former employers, the courts might impose a greater duty on prospective
employers to contact former employers. Also, the statute could lead to the
development of an affirmative duty on former employers to divulge employment
information. Because of the protection given to employers who give references,
the courts might be persuaded to consider recognizing the new tort of negligent
referral in Louisiana.
In conclusion, suggestions for legislative reform will be offered, so that the
statute will more effectively meet its goal of increasing the flow of employment
information.
9. The statutes surveyed by the author include: Alaska Stat. § 9.65.160 (1996); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1361 (Supp. 1997); Cal. Civ. Code § 47 (West Supp. 1997); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-2-114 (West 1994); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.095 (West 1997); Ga. Code
Ann. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1997); Idaho Code § 44-201 (1997); Ind. Code Ann. § 22-5-3-1 (West
Supp. 1997); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-119a (Supp. 1996); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 598
(West Supp. 1996); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-423 (Supp. 1998); Mich. Comp.
Laws Ann. § 423.452 (West Supp. 1997); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 50-12-1 (Michie Supp. 1997);
Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 40, § 61 (West Supp. 1997); Or. Rev. Stat. § 30.178 (Supp. 1996);
R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1 (Supp. 1996); S.C. Code Ann. § 41-1-65 (Law. Co-op. Supp.
1996); S.D. Codified Laws § 60-4-12 (Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. § 50-1-105 (Supp.
1996); Utah Code Ann. § 34-42-1 (Supp. 1996).
10. La. R.S. 23:291(B) (Supp. 1998).
11. Some of the torts generally associated with employment reference information include:
defamation, invasion of privacy, interference with economic advantage, intentional infliction of
emotional distress, negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision. Landry &
Hoffman, supra note 1, at 457.
12. Landry & Hoffman, supra note I, at 460.
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It. EMPLOYMENT DEFAMATION IN LOUISIANA
A. Development of the Law
The common law and early Louisiana law governing defamation" were
similar. Both provided a form of strict liability for defamation claims. 4 This
amounted to liability upon proof of a statement's falsity, irrespective of the
speaker's care in uttering it.' The importance placed on a citizen's reputation
was even further underscored by the fact that damages were presumed.'6 As
an early Louisiana case stated, "[a]ny publication which is false and
defamatory subjects the publisher to damages in favor of the party ag-
grieved .. ."17
Although the common law, as well as Louisiana law, had always applied
strict liability to defamation claims, in 1964 the United States Supreme Court
changed the law of defamation in the landmark case The New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan." The Court held that the First Amendment guarantees prohibit a
public official from recovering damages for a defamatory statement, unless he
proves the statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless
disregard as to its falsity.' 9
Ten years later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,"0 the high Court differenti-
ated between private and public defamation.2' Gertz declared that "so long as
they do not impose liability without fault, States may define for themselves the
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood
injurious to a private individual (at least where the defamatory potential of the
material is apparent on its face)."2 The Court also stated that a party who
wishes to recover must establish by clear and convincing proof that the
defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.2
13. Defamation is "[aln intentional false communication, either published or publically spoken,
that injures another's reputation or good name." It includes both libel and slander. Black's Law
Dictionary 417 (6th. ed. 1990).
14. Jackson v. Briede, 156 La. 573, 100 So. 722 (La. 1924); Poissenet v. Reuther, 51 La. Ann.
965, 25 So. 937 (La. 1899); Wiel v. Isreal, 42 La. Ann. 955, 8 So. 826 (La. 1890); 2 Frank L.
Maraist, Louisiana Tort Law: Cases and Materials 613 (3d ed. 1995); Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 580B cmt. b (1977).
15. Maraist, supra note 14, at613; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580Bcmt. b(1977); Wiel,
42 La. Ann. 955, 8 So. 826.
16. Maraist, supra note 14, at 613. See, e.g., Alloway v. Fitzgerald, 158 La. 54, 103 So. 440
(La. 1925).
17. Weil, 42 La. Ann. at 959, 8 So. at 828.
18. 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710 (1964).
19. Id.; Mashbum v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879 (La. 1977).
20. 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
21. Id. at 347-48, 94 S. Ct. at 3010-1I.
22. Id. at 347-48, 94 S. Ct. at 3010.
23. Id. at 348-50, 94 S. Ct. at 3011..
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As the individual states were allowed to define their own standards of
liability as long as they did not adopt strict liability, the Louisiana Supreme
'Court enumerated the elements, including the element of fault, for defamation in
Louisiana. 4
However, in 1993 the United States Fifth Circuit found that the element of
fault that Gertz required may be unnecessary under the United States Constitu-
tion. In Snead v. Redland Aggregates Ltd., the United States Fifth Circuit
declared that the constitution imposes no minimum standard of fault in private
defamation cases." Thus, it seems that a state is not required to, but is free to,
impose a fault requirement. Louisiana courts have continued to follow the
supreme court's enumeration of the elements found in Cangelosi v Schwegmann
Bros. Giant Super-Markets.2
B. The Prima Facie Case
In Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super-Markets,7 the Louisiana
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff must prove the following elements to
maintain an action for defamation: (1) defamatory statement; (2) publication; (3)
falsity; (4) actual or implied malice; and (5) resulting injury. The burden on a
defamation plaintiff to withstand a motion for summary judgment is heavy.2"
Regardless of the general preference for trial on the merits when issues of
material fact are asserted, defamation claims are extremely susceptible to
summary adjudication due to the constitutional considerations involved. 9 A
plaintiff opposing summary judgment bears a more onerous burden of proof than
plaintiffs in other actions, for he must demonstrate that sufficient evidence exists
to establish the prima facie elements with convincing clarity.3 0 Each of the
elements is examined below.3'
1. Defamatory Statement
The first element required for a defamation action in Louisiana is the
presence of a defamatory statement. A statement is defamatory when it tends to
"harm the reputation of another so as to lower him or her in the estimation of
24. Cangelosi v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super-Markets, 390 So. 2d 196 (La. 1980).
25. 998 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1993), reh g denied, S F.3d 1493, cert. dismissed, 511 U.S. 1050,
114 S. Ct. 1587 (1994).
26. Maraist, supra note 14, at 613; see, e.g., Hines v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 613 So. 2d
646, 651 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 617 So. 2d 932 (1993).
27. 390 So. 2d 196, 198 (La. 1980).
28. Sassone v. Elder, 626 So. 2d 345, 351-52 (La. 1993).
29. I. at 352. These are First Amendment considerations.
30. Id. at 351.
31. Each element will be discussed with the exception of falsity. It is most often treated by
the courts as an affirmative defense; therefore, it will be discussed in Section II.C.
19981 11.35
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the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."3 Defamatory statements are divided into two groups.-those which are
defamatory per se and those which are susceptible of a defamatory meaning.33
Generally, in employment situations, statements are found to be defamatory
per se "[w]hen words themselves have a natural tendency to injure a person in
his-occupation or to injure his reputation, even without considering extrinsic facts
or. surrounding circumstances .... 3"' A statement that expressly or implicitly
accuses another of criminal conduct or injures one's personal or professional
reputation by its very nature is defamatory per se." For example, in Fourcade
v. City of Gretna," a police academy director accused a cadet of using steroids.
The court found the accusation to be defamatory per se, even though the use of
the drug in certain circumstances was not illegal at the time. Also, the court
in Smith v. Atkins 8 found that an adjunct professor calling a female student a
"slut" in class was defamatory per se. If the plaintiff proves the publication of
a statement that is defamatory per se, the elements of falsity, malice, and injury
are rebuttably presumed, and the burden then shifts to the defendant.39
When words are not defamatory per se, the plaintiff must prove (in addition
to the other elements) that the statement was defamatory. Louisiana courts will
gather the meaning of the alleged defamatory statement from the context as well
as the words.4 All parts of the statement and the circumstances of its publica-
tion are considered to determine whether it is defamatory.4' The ultimate test
is the effect "'it is fairly calculated to produce and the impression it would
naturally engender in the mind of the average person to whom it is communicat-
ed.'
42
2. Publication
The second required element for a defamation action is publication. A
publication is a communication to a person other than the one bringing the
action.43 It is essential to a claim of defamation that the allegedly defamatory
32. Sassone, 626 So. 2d at 352.
33. Lemeshewsky v. Dumaine, 464 So. 2d 973, 975 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1985).
34. Id.
35. Elmer v. Coplin, 485 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 489 So. 2d 246 (La.
1986).
36. 598 So. 2d 415, 418 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992).
37. Id. at 421.
38. 622 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
39. Elmer, 485 So. 2d at 177.
40. Davis v. Southern Say. Ass'n, 557 So. 2d 1011, 1014 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
41. Id.
42. Id. (quoting Taylor v. Town of Arcadia, 519 So. 2d 303 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
522 So. 2d 1097 (1988)).
43. Parsons v. Gulf South Am. Steamship Co., 194 So. 2d 456, 457 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
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statement is published by the defendant." This is because defamation is a tort
theory that protects the reputation, and no harm can be sustained if it is only
uttered to the person it concerns.45
A recent development in employment defamation law is the theory of "self-
compelled" defamation or "self-publication."" Generally, there is no publica-
tion where a defendant communicates a statement directly to a plaintiff, who then
communicates it to a third person. 7 However, under the doctrine of "self-
compelled" defamation or "self-publication," courts recognize a narrow
exception. Under this theory, a former employer could be held liable for
defamation when the statement in question was published to the prospective
employer only by the prospective employee. Courts which recognize this theory
have held that a former employer has "published" if a former employee was
given a defamatory reason for termination, and it was foreseeable to the
employer that the former employee will be compelled to disclose the defamatory
reason for termination to prospective employers." Although most jurisdictions
do not recognize this theory, at least ten states do.49
Louisiana courts appear to have implicitly rejected the doctrine of "self-
compelled" publication as a theory of recovery." While Louisiana courts have
inferred publication based on circumstantial evidence,51 publication has never
44. Id.
45. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 cmt. b (1977).
46. Swerdlow, supra note I, at 1648; Lewis et al., supra note I, at 836.
47. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 577 cmt. m (1977).
48. Daigle v. Computrac, 835 F. Supp. 903 (E.D. La. 1993); Lewis, supra note 1, at 836; Adler
& Pierce, supra note I, at 1400.
49. Adler & Pierce, supra note I, at 1400. For a case recognizing the theory see. e.g., Lewis
v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986). In Lewis, the Minnesota
Supreme Court stated:
The concept of compelled self.publication does no more than hold the originator of the
defamatory statement liable for damages caused by the statement where the originator
knows, or should know, of circumstances whereby the defamed person has no reasonable
means of avoiding publication of the statement or avoiding the resulting damages; in other
words, in cases where the defamed person was compelled to publish the statement. In
such circumstances, the damages are fairly viewed as the direct result of the originator's
actions.
Most courts use the standard of "compelled" or "in some way compelled" to republish the
statement. However, at least one court has stated "under a strong compulsion." (emphasis added).
McKinney v. County of Santa Clara, 168 Cal. Rptr. 89 (Ca. Ct. App. 1989).
50. Daigle, 835 F. Supp. at 908.
51. Melancon v. Hyatt Corp., 589 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991). In Melancon,
the court held that a plaintiff may establish publication by circumstantial evidence. The plaintiff sued
his former employer for defamation. To prove publication, the plaintiff presented the testimony of
two former employees of the defendant, both of whom testified that certain other employees of the
defendant had communicated to them the reasons for the plaintiff's firing. Although the other
employees did not testify, the court held that such circumstantial evidence was enough to establish
publication. Neither side called the other employees to confirm or refute the evidence of the two
former employees who did testify.
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been found if only the plaintiff, and not the defendant, communicated the
offending statement to a third party.52 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana read the "tea leaves of Louisiana case literature"
and concluded that "Louisiana courts would likely not adopt this controversial
and attenuated theory of delictual conduct."" The court also discouraged the
adoption of the theory as it "would pervert the essential evil of publication that
the law seems to condemn."5  It would be detrimental to employers in
Louisiana if this theory did emerge. Employers would no longer be shielded
from defamation litigation by simply not giving references. it would also deter
employers from discussing with employees the reasons for termination, thus
stifling communications concerning job problems.'5 Another policy reason for
not adopting this theory is that it might discourage employees from mitigating
damages by avoiding such republication or explaining the true nature of the
situation.'
3. Malice
The fourth element required for a defamation action in Louisiana is actual
or implied malice. The employee must prove the element of malice when the
statement is not defamatory per se. Malice is the fault element that was not
required in early Louisiana cases. Malice may be inferred or implied from the
circumstances surrounding the communication. For example, in Baudoin v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co.," an employer wrote a letter which stated a
search was made for missing company property and as a result of the search
certain employees (including Baudoin) were no longer permitted on the worksite.
After considering the evidence, which provided only a "loose connection"
between Baudoin and the stolen property, the court found that Baudoin was
52. See, e.g., Hoover v. Livingston Bank, 451 So. 2d 3 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1984).
53. Daigle, 835 F. Supp. at 907.
54. Id.
55. Lewis, supra note I, at 836.
56. Lewis, supra note 1, at 859, 860. However, at least one court recognizing the theory has
also recognized that the employee has a duty to mitigate. In Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876 (Minn. 1986), the defendant argued the doctrine of self-publication would
discourage plaintiffs from mitigating damages. The court stated:
This concern does not appear to be a problem, however, if liability for self-publication
of defamatory statement is imposed only where the plaintiff was in some significant way
compelled to repeat the defamatory statement and such compulsion was, or should have
been, foreseeable to the defendant. Also, the duty to mitigate can be further protected by
requiring plaintiffs when they encounter a situation in which they are compelled to repeat
a defamatory statement to take all reasonable steps to attempt to explain the true nature
of the situation and to contradict the defamatory statement. In such circumstances, there
would be no voluntary act on the part of the plaintiff that would constitute a failure to
mitigate....
57. 540 So. 2d 1283 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
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seriously implicated without just or probable cause.5" The court implied malice
based on the letter.5 9 When a statement is made without reasonable grounds for
believing its truth, the author can be said to have been motivated by malice.'
4. Injury or Harm
If the statement is not defamatory per se, the last element of defamation the
plaintiff must prove is injury. Injury may include nonpecuniary or general
damages such as injury to reputation, personal humiliation, and mental anguish.
The harm element may also include special damages, such as loss of income.6'
It is possible for a former employee to recover damages, even when no special
damages are claimed, if the former employee can show a "but for" causal
connection between the employer's conduct and the employee's humiliation,
anxiety, or hurt feelings.62
C. Affirmative Defenses
Once an employee has established a prima facie case, recovery may be
precluded if the employer sets forth an affirmative defense. The affirmative
defenses available to an employer are truth, consent, constitutional privilege, and
qualified privilege.
1. Truth
In common law and Louisiana law, truth has always been a defense to
defamation. 6' This protection even extends to those employers who do not
actually believe the statement is true, as long as the statement is actually true."'
However, truth is an imperfect defense for employers.6" What the employer
might think is the "truth" concerning a subjective evaluation of an employee's
attitude or abilities, the jury might consider not to be the "truth." For example,
in Alford v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,6 the employee claimed that the statement
made to prospective employers by his former employer that he was "a good
58. Id. at 1286.
59. Id.
60. Hines v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 613 So.2d 646,655 (La. App. 2d Cir.), reh "gdenied,
617 So. 2d 939 (1993).
61. Freeman v. Cooper, 390 So. 2d 1355, 1360 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980), afftd, 414 So. 2d 355
(1982).
62. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 460, 96 S. Ct. 958, 968 (1976).
63.. Maraist, supra note 14, at 613; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A (1977); Alloway v.
Fitzgerald, 158 La. 54, 55, 103 So. 440, 441 (La. 1925); Pool v. Gaudin, 209 La. 218, 24 So. 2d 383
(La. 1945).
64. W. Page Keeton et at., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 116 (5th ed. 1984).
65. Lewis, supra note 1, at 822.
66. 331 So. 2d 558 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1976).
i11391998]
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draftsman, a good engineer on board, but had trouble pushing a crew" was
knowingly false. The case was originally tried to a jury which returned a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff. A new trial was granted and the trial judge
found from the evidence in the record that the statement was true and, therefore,
not defamatory.6 If facts are debatable in the least, a jury might be more
sympathetic to an out-of-work employee's version of the "truth" than to the
employer's version.
2. Consent
Another bar to recovery for defamation is consent."" The consent of
another to the publication of defamatory matter concerning him is a complete
defense to an action for defamation. 9 In the employment context, the most
common way in which an employee consents to defamation is by signing a
waiver or a release of defamation claims. This waiver, which would bar claims
against former employers who provide employment information, may be
presented to an employee by a prospective employer upon application for a job.
A waiver or release could also be part of a settlement arising out of the
termination of the employee.
Recently, a federal appeals court found that a release signed by an applicant
for ajob with the Federal Aviation Administration that absolved former employers
from liability for information provided during background checks created an
absolute privilege against defamation liability. 70 A Texas court also found that
a consent waiver gave an absolute privilege, even if the statements made were
defamatory, because the sensitivity of the job sought required complete candor
from former employers.7 Generally, the consent expressed in a waiver provided
by a former or future employer will bar any action for defamation. 2
However, some courts have eroded this protection by ruling that neither
consent nor release bars an action for defamation, because a party should not be
able to absolve itself from an intentional tort. For example, a Florida court found
that a release only confers a qualified immunity, which means the privilege could
be abused and lost if the statement were shown to be made with malice."
Louisiana courts have not yet dealt directly with this issue. In National Oil
Service of Louisiana, Inc. v. Brown," an employee had signed a contract that
contained a non-competition agreement and other prohibitory conditions relating
to the employee's activities after termination of employment. The court stated
67. Id. at 559. The appellate court also affirmed this decision.
68. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 583 (1977).
69. Id.
70. Cox v. Nasche, 70 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 1995).
71. Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433 (Tx. Ct. App. 1992).
72. Frank B. Hall & Co., Inc. v. Buck, 678 S.W. 2d 612 (Tx. Ct. App. 1984).
73. Kellums v. Freight Sales Ctrs., Inc., 467 So. 2d 816, 817-18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
74. 381 So. 2d 1269 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1980).
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that it did not need to reach "the question of enjoining free speech which causes
damages," because it interpreted the waiver as not extending to defamation
claims." In Tolis v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University,76 the
fourth circuit court of appeals avoided the question by stating that the waiver,
found in a compromise agreement arising out of Tolis' termination, only affected
torts committed prior to the agreement; thus, the plaintiff could bring the claim
of defamation. In Elmer v. Coplin, the court acknowledged "a release from
future liability cannot protect one from damages for an intentional tort or for
actions taken in bad faith or ill will or malice."" However, the court found
that a letter containing defamatory statements concerning a bar applicant was
protected by a release signed by the applicant and the conditional privilege of
two parties with mutual interests. 8 Considering these cases, it is possible to
conclude that Louisiana courts will either find a technicality in the waiver or will
not consider the waiver as binding unless it is accompanied by an existing
conditional privilege.
3. Constitutional Privilege
Another affirmative defense to a defamation claim is constitutional privilege.
This privilege protects the First Amendment right of the speaker to state his
opinion. An employment reference will often contain a former employer's
subjective opinion of an employee. There is confusion as to the defamatory
quality of opinion. Pure opinion is not actionable in defamation. The Court in
Gertz stated: "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false
idea."' 9  It is reasonable, then, to assume that an opinion would never be
actionable, as it would always be true.
However, employers who look to the constitutional privilege for protection
in giving employment references will be disappointed." The constitutional
privilege provides little, if any, protection.8' The distinction between fact and
opinion is not always clear, especially when' the statements are made in
evaluations of an employee's job performance. 2 Courts may conclude that a
statement is mixed opinion and fact, even when no facts are recited, if the
reference implies that facts are the basis of the opinion. In Davis v. Ross,84
75. Id. at 1274.
76. 602 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992).
77. 485 So. 2d 171, 177 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1986).
78. Id. at 179.
79. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339, 94 S. Ci. 2997, 3007 (1974).
80. Adler & Pierce, supra note 1, at 1407.
8. Id.
82. Lewis, supra note I. at 810.
83. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977) states: "A defamatory communication may
consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if
it implies the allegation of undisclosed facts as the basis for the opinion."
84. 754 F.2d 80 (2d Cir. 1985).
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singer Diana Ross issued a letter listing the names of seven former employees."s
In the letter she stated, "If I let an employee go, it's because either their work
or their personal habits are not acceptable to me. I do not :recommend these
people. In fact if you hear from these people, and they ue my name as a
reference, I wish to be contacted." 6 One of the named former employees who
voluntarily resigned sued Ross for $2 million, claiming the letter falsely asserted
that Ross had fired her because of inadequate work or personal habits. The
district court dismissed the claim, stating that the letter only expressed Ross'
personal dissatisfaction rather than a general lack of capacity or unfitness. 7
The Second Circuit reversed, finding that a jury could find that Ross based her
statements upon "false facts" within her knowledge. 8 In order to be defended
as a "fair comment," which is an opinion protected by the First Amendment, it
must be recognizable by the ordinary, reasonable person as opinion and not as
a statement of fact. 9
4. Qualified Privilege
The most important defense for an employer is the qualified privilege. The
qualified privilege, or conditional privilege, protects information given in good
faith to a person with a corresponding interest or duty.* While early Louisiana
jurisprudence makes no mention of a particular privilege between a former
employer and a prospective employer, the common law did recognize this
particular type of privilege.9 ' By holding that a party with a conditional
privilege fell outside of the normal strict liability for a defamatory condition, the
common law balanced employer and employee rights.92
While not expressly related to communications between former employers
and prospective employers, Louisiana has always recognized that liability for
defamation does not attach to privileged publications or communications.93 A
"qualified or conditional" privilege is applicable if the communication is (i) in
good faith, and is (2) on a subject in which the person making the comment has
an interest or in reference to which he has a duty to a person having a
corresponding interest or duty. 4
To be in "good faith" within the meaning of the qualified privilege require-
ments, the person making the statement must not only honestly believe the
85. Lewis, supra note I, at 811, 812.
86. Davis, 754 F.2d at 81-82.
87. Id. at 82.
88. Id. at 86.
89. Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So. 2d 879, 885 (La. 1977).
90. Elmer v. Coplin, 485 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 489 So. 2d 246 (1986).
91. Adler & Pierce, supra note I, at 1393.
92. Id.
93. Hines v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 613 So. 2d 646, 656-57 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ
denied, 617 So. 2d 932 (1993).
94. Id.
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statement, but must also have reasonable grounds for believing it to be a correct
statement. 95 However, ultimate truth is not necessarily required.96 This permits
an employer to be wrong as long as it is a reasonable and honest mistake. The
privilege can be abused, and the protection lost, if it is proven that the person
making the statement was motivated by malice or ill will.9" "Only when lack of
such reasonable grounds [for belief in the statement] is found can it be said that
the person uttering the statement is actuated by malice or ill-will." 'g
The privilege has been found applicable in many employment situations. It
has been applied to an employer who initiates an investigation of employee
misconduct, even if others become aware of the investigation and the subsequent
discharge of the employee. 9 Employers who furnish information necessary to
state agencies to aid in determining unemployment compensation benefits in a
quasi-judicial proceeding are also protected by the privilege."° Louisiana has
also recognized a qualified privilege for statements made by one company
employee to another.'0 ' Employers should note, however, that in all of these
situations, the privilege can be lost if the statement is not made in good faith and
to a person with an interest or a corresponding duty.' For example, in
Baudoin v. Louisiana Power and Light Co.,"" the employee was defamed by
the employer in a letter written to the labor union which strongly implied that
the employee was guilty of such misconduct as to bar his continued employment.
While privilege may be a sound defense to a defamation suit, the court implied
malice and decided the privilege was lost because there was no reasonable
foundation for the accusation. The court in Fourcade v. City of Gretna ° also
found that police academy directors abused and lost the privilege upon making
comments concerning suspicions of a cadet's steroid usage. The court found that
the directors' comments to two former graduates and the plaintiff's father were
not made in the context of any legitimate interest or in good faith.'05
In Alford v. Georgia-Pacific Corp. , a Louisiana court first applied the
conditional privilege to statements made by a former employer to a prospective
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Cormier v. Blake, 198 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
98. Martin v. Lincoln Gen. Hosp., 588 So. 2d 1329, 1333 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
99. Hines v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co., 613 So. 2d 646 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 617
So. 2d 932 (1993); Wright v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 602 So. 2d 772 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Roberts
v. Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., 550 So. 2d 809 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1989).
100. White v. Baker Manor Nursing Home, 400 So. 2d 1168 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981); Boyd v.
Community Ctr. Credit Corp., 359 So. 2d 1048 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978); Harrison v. Uniroyal, Inc.,
366 So. 2d 983 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1978).
101. Diner v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., No. 87-5880, 1988 WL 76240 (E.D La. 1988).
102. Baudoin v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 540 So. 2d 1283 (La.. App. 5th Cir. 1989).
103. Id. at 1284.
104. 598 So. 2d 415, 422 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1992).
105. Id.
106. 331 So. 2d 558 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1976).
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employer. The plaintiff, Alford, was hired by Georgia-Pacific as an electrical
engineer. Approximately three years later, Alford was terminated without a
formal reason logged in his personnel file, but the personnel manager verbally
indicated that Alford had trouble motivating and working with people in the
field." 7 Subsequent to his discharge, Alford applied for several positions with
other local concerns. These prospective employers contacted Georgia-Pacific to
obtain a work performance evaluation.' In the course of one conversation,
an agent of Georgia-Pacific stated that Alford was "a good draftsman, a good
engineer on the board, but had trouble 'pushing a crew."'10 The court stated
that as long as good faith (an honest and reasonable belief) is present, the
employer making the statement should not be limited to strictly personal
knowledge, but should be allowed to divulge any relevant information that is
second-hand and beyond the scope of the employer's personal knowledge."'
The policy motivating this decision was the desire to have free exchange of
information between employers. "To hold otherwise would either tend to stifle
communication of qualification and character evaluations, inherently subjective
in nature, or alternatively, would breed deception in its wake."' The court
stated that the shared interest requirement is met by the interest of employers in
receiving honest evaluations from other employers in the future.1 2
In Alford, the court recognized that the privilege is not absolute. However,
the court found that the presence of some bad feelings does not automatically
imply abuse of the privilege as long as the publication is made primarily for the
purpose of furthering the protected interest."' The recognition of this idea is
important in employment reference situations, because often the termination of
employment leaves the parties with at least some ill-feeling.
III. VICARIOUS LIABILITY AND HIRING TORTS
Employers who are unable to receive candid employment references are
hindered in determining the quality and characterof prospective employees. This
increases the probability that employees with dangerous propensities will be hired
and makes employers more vulnerable to liability through the theory of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.
According to Louisiana Civil Code article 2320, "[m]asters and employers
are answerable for the damage occasioned by their servants and overseers, in the
exercise of the functions in which they are employed.""" Generally, an
107.' Id. at 559.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 559.
110. Id. at 562.
III. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. La. Civ. Code art. 2320.
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employer will be held liable for an employee's intentional tort only "where its
purpose, however misguided, is wholly or in part to further the [employer's]
business.'" The Louisiana Supreme Court recently confirmed this rule in
Baumiester v. Plunkett,' 6 by stating: "'Vicarious liability will attach [when
an employee commits an intentional tort] only if the employee is acting within
the ambit of his assigned duties and also in the furtherance of his employer's
objective. ' " "
In Baumeister, the court held that a hospital was not vicariously liable for
an alleged sexual assault by a supervisor in the nurses' lounge."' The court
analyzed the following factors, announced in the leading case Lebrane v.
Lewis," 9 to determine the hospital's liability: (1) whether the violence was
reasonably incidental to the performance of the employee's duties; (2) whether
the tortious act was primarily employment rooted; (3) whether the act occurred
on the employer's premises; and (4) whether it occurred during the hours of
employment. The court found that while the third and fourth factors were
present, the first factor was not met. The sexual assault was not a risk
reasonably incidental to the performance of the supervisor's duties, because "[a]
nursing supervisor's responsibilities do not include sexually oriented physical
contact with a co-employee." 20 Likewise, the court found the fourth element
was not present. The act was not primarily employment rooted, because the
sexual assault was entirely extraneous to the employer's interest. 2 '
In most cases the predominant factor is whether the employee's actions are
predominately employment rooted. In Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 2
an employee raped a patient in the unit while he was on duty. The court found the
hospital vicariously liable to the patient, because the tortious conduct was
reasonably incidental to the performance of his duties. The court stated that the
act was totally unauthorized by the employer, and motivated by the interest of the
employee; however,. the act was so closely connected to his employment duties
that the risk of harm was fairly attributable to the employer.' 23 Conversely, the
court in Pye v. Insulation Technologies, Inc., 2 ' found that the worker's tortious
act was not primarily employment rooted. The court found that the likelihood that
an employee would strike a supervisor in the face with a piece of driftwood is not
a risk fairly attributable to the performance of the employee's duties. 2'
115.. Keeton et al., supra note 64, § 70.
116. 673 So. 2d 994 (La. 1996).
117. Id. at 996 (quoting Scott v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 415 So. 2d 327, 329 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1982)).
118. Id. at 1000.
119. 292 So. 2d 216 (La. 1974).
120. Baumiester, 673 So. 2d at 999.
121. Id. at 999.
122. 594 So. 2d 571 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 599 So. 2d 316 (1992).
123. id. at 574.
124. 700 So. 2d 892 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1997).
125. Id. at 894.
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If a plaintiff is unable to prove that the employee was in the course
and scope of his employment, or that the employee's actions were
reasonably attributable to the performance of his employment, the plaintiff
may rely on the alternative theory of negligent hiring and/or negligent
retention. The supreme court expressly recognized the tort of negligent
hiring as cognizable under the Louisiana fault principles embodied in
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315."6 Louisiana recognizes these theories
when brought by third parties.'
A. Prima Facie Case
Generally, a case against an employer for the torts of an employee
based on negligence in hiring or retaining that employee is governed by
the same duty-risk analysis used for all negligence cases.' The plaintiff
must prove: (1) duty; (2) breach of duty; (3) cause-in-fact; (4) scope of
the liability; and (5) damages.'29 Each of these elements is examined
below.'3°
126. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1992), on reh'g.
127. Third party: see, e.g., Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991), on reh'g; Jackson
v. Ferrand, 658 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994), writ denied, 659 So. 2d 496 (1995); Bohmfalk
v. City of New Orleans, 628 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied, 634 So. 2d 376'
(1994); Williams v. Butler, 577 So. 2d 1113 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991); Smith v. Orkin Exterminating
Co., 540 So. 2d 363 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989); Lou-Con, Inc. V. Gulf Bldg. Servs., Inc., 287 So. 2d
192 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
In general claims based on intentional torts are excluded from worker's compensation immunity.
It is possible that intentional torts exclusion could be interpreted broadly to include negligent hiring.
There seems to be a, split of authority among the states as to whether the courts will recognize a
claim of negligent hiring brought by a co-employee or whether it will be barred by worker's
compensation. For example, in Tolbert v. Martin Marietta Corp., 759 P.2d 17 (Co. 1988), a co-
employee's rape of an employee while she was on her way to lunch in the company cafeteria arose
out of employment due to fixed hours in a place of employment and the neutral nature of the attack,
thus the employee could not bring a negligent hiring claim as worker's compensation was
the exclusive remedy. However, see Woodson v. Rowland, 407 S.E.2d 222 (N.C. 1991),
where the administratrix of an employee killed by the negligence of an incompetent or
unqualified fellow employee was allowed to recover against the employer of both on the
theory that the employer's negligence was tantamount to an intentional tort. Thus civil
actions based thereon were not barred by the exclusivity provision of the worker's
compensation act.
The question has not been addressed specifically in Louisiana. In Luccia v. Cummings, 646 So.
2d 1142 (La. App. 5th Cit. 1994), writ denied, 649 So. 2d 406 (La. 1995), the third circuit court of
appeals found the employer not liable for negligent hiring without a discussion of whether a claim
for negligent hiring was properly brought by a co-employee.
128. Jackson, 658 So. 2d at 698.
129. Smith, 540 So. 2d at 365.
130. Each will be discussed with the exception of damages.
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1. Duty
There is no generally recognized duty to protect others from the criminal
activity of a third person.13 ' However, an employer who hires an employee
that will have a unique opportunity in the performance of his duties to commit
a crime against a third party has "a duty to exercise reasonable care in the
selection of that employee" and in some circumstances has a "continuing duty to
exercise reasonable care in the retention of its employees."'3 2 Thus, Louisiana
law recognizes that some employers have a duty to exercise reasonable care in
hiring and retaining some employees. Jurisprudence has shown that the duty is
owed by some employers, especially by employers in hotels, " businesses that
deal with children,'34 and any business that comes into the homes of its
customers.1
35
2. Breach of the Duty
A key issue in hiring cases is whether the employer adequately investigated
the fitness of the prospective employee. The problem most employers face in
establishing hiring practices is that the courts have not established firm guidelines
to follow to avoid a finding of breach. Every negligence case must be decided
on its own facts and circumstances."' Employers, without the benefit of
hindsight that a court has, are left doubtful as to what does and does not
constitute a breach of the duty of reasonable care in hiring employees and thus,
find themselves in a precarious position.
It is clear that the sensitivity of the job is an important factor that Louisiana
courts consider. In Lou-Con, Inc. v. Gulf Building Services, Inc.,' 7 the fourth
circuit court of appeals stated that the fact that the employer did not check the
federal criminal record was reasonable since the employee was a janitor, which
was not considered a sensitive position, and the employee's job application on
its face was not questionable. In Williams v. Butler,"' the first circuit court
of appeal reasoned that a supervisor entrusted with the well-being of children
was in a sensitive position. Therefore, BREC" had breached the duty of care
by not even reviewing the application of an employee who left the criminal
history question blank. The court has also found that an employer hiring a hotel
employee who had access to guests and rooms, should have conducted a criminal
131. Smith, 540 So. 2d at 366.
132. Id.
133. Jackson, 658 So. 2d 691.
134. Williams v. Butler, 577 So. 2d 1113 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
135. Smith, 540 So. 2d 363.
136. Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So. 2d 1032, 1055 (La. 1992), on reh'g.
137. .287 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973), writ denied, 290 So. 2d 899 (1974).
138. 577 So. 2d 1113 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1991).
139. Baton Rouge Recreation and Parks Commission.
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record search because of the high degree of care that a customer expects from
a hotel employee. 4
Another factor considered is the care taken by the employer in executing a
procedure previously established by that employer for reviewing prospective
employees and supervising employees. In Smith v. Orkin Exterminating
Company, Inc., 4' the exterminating company was held liable for a rape
committed by an employee. The company subjected its employees to yearly
polygraph examinations. The company was found negligent because, if the
polygraph test had been properly performed, the test would have revealed the
employee's prior rape convictions. In Williams v. Butler,'42 BREC had a
policy of checking criminal backgrounds of its supervisors, but did not follow
this policy in the instant case, because the employee was a janitor who was
promoted. BREC was found to have negligently hired Butler. BREC was also
found negligent in supervising Butler. His supervisor was supposed to check on
him several times a day; however, he simply drove by the center and did not
stop.
3. Cause-in-Fact
Causation between the breach and the injury must be shown. Under
Louisiana Civil Code article 2315, the plaintiff must prove that the conduct in
question was a cause-in-fact of the harm which occurred.' 43 In Roberts v.
Benoit,' a cook was commissioned as a deputy so that he was eligible to
receive supplemental pay. After work, the cook/deputy, carrying a revolver in
an ankle holster, went to his brother-in-law's home where he consumed alcohol.
The cook/deputy began playing with the gun, and shortly thereafter the revolver
discharged, severely injuring the plaintiff. The issue before the court was
whether the sheriff, his employer, should be held legally responsible for the acts
of the cook/deputy. The court found that the cook/deputy was not exercising any
funciion for which he was employed; therefore, the sheriff was not vicariously
liable. 4 The plaintiff also asserted that the sheriff should be directly liable
for negligently hiring, commissioning, and training the cook/deputy. 4
In deciding if the sheriff was negligent, the court discussed cause-in-fact.
"The cause-in-fact inquiry is a neutral one, free of the entanglements of policy
considerations-morality, culpability or responsibility-involved in the duty-risk
140. Jackson v. Ferrand, 658 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1994), writ denied, 659 So. 2d 496
(1995).
141. 540 So. 2d 363 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1989).
142. Williams, 577 So. 2d 1113.
143. Bohmfalk v. City of New Orleans, 628 So. 2d 1143 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993), writ denied,
634 So. 2d 376 (1994).
144. 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991), on reh g.
145. Id. at 1041.
146. Id. at 1036.
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analysis." 47  The supreme court stated that cause-in-fact is a matter upon
which lay opinion is quite as competent as that of the most experienced
court." 8 The court held that the test of a factual, causal relationship is met if
the plaintiff can produce enough evidence to show that "the defendant's actions
had something to do with the injury the plaintiff sustained."' 49 While not
finding the sheriff liable, the court did find that the cause-in-fact element was
met as the sheriff's negligence in hiring, training, and/or commissioning the
cook/deputy had something to do with the plaintiffs injuries. On rehearing, the.
court admitted that the "but for" relationship was too attenuated, but said that the
fact that the cook/deputy did not possess the basic qualifications of education,
experience, and training appreciably enhanced the chances of the accident
occurring. 50
4. Scope of Liability
The plaintiff must also prove that he falls within the scope of the protection
of the duty. The fact that an employer was negligent in hiring an employee who
was guilty of a certain tort does not mean that the employee's commission of a
different tort falls within the scope of the employer's liability. For example, the
fourth circuit held that the failure to discover a previous conviction for stealing
welfare checks was not a legal cause of the harm suffered (arson), even when the
employee committed arson in an effort to conceal his theft of money. 5'
Likewise, the discovery of an employee's guilty plea to theft, his alcoholism, and
his personality problems, would not have made.it reasonably foreseeable that the
employee might commit rape.5 2  In Jackson v. Ferrand,153 the court stated
that a hotel worker's criminal history of theft and carrying a concealed weapon
does not encompass the risk that he would commit a sexual assault. If the harm
is not encompassed within the scope, the claim of negligence will fail.
Considering these cases, the jurisprudence seems to protect employers, narrowing
the scope by deciding that the negligence of an employer in not discovering one
crime or tort does not make the employer responsible for all torts.
It is clear that the jurisprudence attempts to protect employers, who inquire
into the background of an employee and hire responsibly, by finding some
element of the prima facie case not satisfied.
147. Id. at 1042.
148. 605 So. 2d 1032 (La. 1991), on reh'g.
149. Id. at 1042.
150. Id. at 1043.
151. Lou-Con, Inc. v. Gulf Bldg. Sers., Inc. 287 So. 2d 192 (La. App. 4th Cit. 1973), writ
denied, 290 So. 2d 899 (1974).
152. Mays v. Pico Fin. Co., 339 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976), writ denied, 341 So. 2d
1123 (1977).
153. 658 So. 2d 691 (La. App. 4th Cit. 1994), writ denied, 659 So. 2d 496 (1995).
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IV. LOUISIANA REVISED STATUTES 23:291
A. Section A
When the legislature adopted Act 643 in 1995, Louisiana joined the growing
number of states which have enacted "shield laws."" The first paragraph of
the statute encourages former employers to disclose employment information to
prospective employers by providing immunity from civil liability. Section A
provides as follows:
A. Any employer that, upon request by a prospective employer or
a current or former employee, provides accurate information about a
current or former employee's job performance or reasons for separation
shall be immune from civil liability and other consequences of such
disclosure provided such employer is not acting in bad faith. An
employer shall be considered to be acting in bad faith only if it can be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the information
disclosed was knowingly false and deliberately misleading.
This section of the bill was intended to give employers added protection
when giving reference information. No cases have been decided using this
statute, so it is unclear how the courts will interpret the language. However, the
language of Section A has several limitations and ambiguities that could pose
potential problems for employers.
The first ambiguity in the statute concerns who receives immunity when
providing employment information. The statute defines an employer as "any
person, firm, or corporation, including the state and its political subdivision, and
their agents, that has one or more employees, or individuals performing services
under any contract of hire or service, expressed or implied, oral or written."'155
It is likely that statements made by supervisory employees will be given
immunity. The question is whether nonsupervisory co-employees fall into this
category of agents given immunity by the statute. 5 '
154. Landry & Hoffman. supra note 1, at 458.
155. La. R.S. 23:291(C) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
156. The United States Supreme Court found that if an agent is guilty of defamation, the
principal is liable so long as the agent was apparently authorized to make the defamatory statement.
American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Co., 456 U.S. 556, 566, 102 S. Ct. 1935,
1942 (1982), reh "gdenied. Likewise, the comments to Restatement (Second) of Agency section 247
note that liability is imputed when the "scope of employment of a servant includes the making of
statements concerning others which he believes to be true and privileged, the master is subject to
liability for untrue and unprivileged defamatory statements made by the servant concerning others."
It is clear that the employer would be liable for the defamatory statements made by the personnel
department. It almost certainly would make employers liable for the defamatory statements of
supervisors, if the apparent authority is manifested through the mere fact of their supervisory
position.
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The policy behind the jurisprudential qualified immunity was to protect
those who share a common interest or duty. The interest was defined as the
interest in receiving employment information. Statements made by a nonsupervi-
sory co-employee ordinarily would not receive the protection under the qualified
immunity. The most likely interpretation of the statute is that immunity would
only be granted to employers and supervisory employees. However, if co-
employees are considered as "agents" of the employer under the statute, a
communication made by a co-employee to a prospective employer would receive
statutory protection.
Some of the other states' shield laws provide the protection for an "employer
or his designee"'57 or an employee who is authorized."'8 These statutes are
expressly more protective of the interest of the employee's business reputation,
in that a co-worker who gossips without actual authorization or designation is not
given statutory immunity. This also would provide an incentive to employers to
provide training to authorized employees. By limiting the immunity from
liability to situations involving designees or authorized employees, the law would
give employers an incentive to appoint and train designees, perhaps reducing the
instances of defamation.
Limiting the interpretation of the term "agents" to designees seems the better
interpretation of the'statute. However, the courts have not yet interpreted the
word "agent" in the Louisiana statute. It is possible that the courts may interpret
it broadly enough to mean any co-employee, but it is more likely that the courts
will interpret it to give immunity only to employers and supervisory employees.
Thus, employers should exercise caution and designate. persons to handle
employment information inquiries. In .addition, employers should caution all
employees against discussing former employees without permission.
The next limitation is that the statute only gives immunity to employers who
give employment information upon request.'59 Thus, like many of the other
states' shield laws, Louisiana's shield law does not protect those who volunteer
The question still remains about co-employees who are not actually authorized to give employment
references. Consider a co-employee who receives a phone call requesting information concerning
a former co-employee. Without the actual authority to do so, but with the intention of serving his
employer, he gives his defamatory opinion about a former co-employee's work habits. The
commentary to Section 235 of the Restatement of Agency states that acts are in the scope of
employment "if the servant is actuated to some extent by an intent to serve his master" and notes that
an employer may still be liable where an employee departs from instructions for his own purposes
if such departure is undertaken with the intent to serve his employer. Restatement (Second) of
Agency § 235 cmts. a & b (1958). See. e.g., Rodriguez v. Sarabyn, 129 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 1997).
157. The Georgia shield law protects any person employed by an employer and designated as
the employer's representative. Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1997). The Kansas shield law
protects "an employer, or an employer's designee." Kan. Stat. Ann. § 44-119a (Supp. 1996).
158. The Oklahoma statute provides, in pertinent part, "any employee, agent, or other
representative of the current or former employer who is authorized .... 40 Okla. Stat. Ann. tit.
40, § 61 (West Supp. 1997).
159. La. R.S. 23:291(A) (Supp. 1998).
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employment information. The shield statutes in some states, such as Utah and
Maine, do not have a request requirement.'" Is the request requirement
present in Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 a prudent limitation to place on the
immunity?
Consider a situation in which an elementary school principal fires a teacher
for suspicion of sexual misconduct. Through the grapevine, she hears that the
former teacher has applied for a job in a nursery school in a nearby town. The
principal would not be protected by the statutory immunity in giving this
information to the nursery school unless the nursery school requested such
information. In this situation, the limitation would seem imprudent. However,
the counterargument is that there is a need for confidentiality when dealing with
a person's business reputation. It is possible that an employer who is zealous in
giving unsolicited information may be influenced by other motives, such as
revenge or ill-feelings that often arise at the termination of employment.
Balancing the interests involved, the requirement that the information be
requested is imprudent. Statements made by a former employer compelled by
a moral duty to divulge are protected by the jurisprudential qualified immunity
if the information is given in good faith. To be a more accurate reflection of the
jurisprudential qualified immunity, the statute should be amended to protect those
who give requested information and those who volunteer information because of
a compelling moral interest.
It is likely that the Louisiana courts will interpret the statute so that it would
not destroy any jurisprudential qualified immunity already provided employers
and employees. Maine's shield statute provides that the statute is "supplemental
to and not in derogation of any claims available to the former employee that
exist under state law and any protections that are already afforded employers
under state law."'' Like most of the other shield statutes, the Louisiana statute
does not have such a clause.
Since the exclusivity of the statutory immunity is not addressed in the
statute, it is arguable that the courts will still allow the jurisprudential immunities
previously available. This will cause a confusing body of case law to .develop
as employers will use either the statute or the jurisprudential qualified immunity
or both. In the interest of developing a unified body of case law concerning
employment information in this state, the Louisiana Legislature should recognize
that the statute is the codification of the jurisprudential qualified immunity and
amend the statute to include a provision declaring the exclusivity of the statute.
Another limitation of the statute is that the information must be given upon
the request of a prospective employer or a current or former employee.' 62
Under a narrow interpretation, a former employer who gives information to an
160. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26 § 598 (West. Supp. 1966); Utah Code Ann. 34-42-1 (Supp.
1996).
161. 26 Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26 § 598 (West Supp. 1996).
162. La. R.S. 23:291(A) (Supp. 1998).
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employer who has already hired the employee is not protected by this statute.
It is possible that the courts might construe the statute to include employers who
have recently hired; however, if the courts do not, the following situation is
entirely possible.
Employer #2 has a position that must be filled immediately. Employer #2
hires Employee on the spot, before he is able to check Employee's references
with Employer #1. When Employer #2 later solicits employment information
from Employer #1, Employer #1 will not be protected under this statute, as
Employer #2 is now an employer rather than a prospective employer.
Therefore, employers should be cautious when giving information. This
interpretation of the statute could possibly delay the hiring process. Many times
employers will have a need for "quick hires." It seems absurd that former
employers who give information to employers of "quick hires" would not be
given protection by the statute for giving the same information immediately after
the hiring. However, a possible benefit would be that employers must seek the
information before the customers, as well as coemployees, are exposed to a
possibly dangerous employee during the period of time between the "quick hire"
and the investigation of the employee's background. Because former employers
will be hesitant to give information post-hiring, prospective employers will be
forced to slow down the hiring process and possibly hire more responsibly.
However, this limitation could have more of a negative effect than a positive
effect. Encouraging employers to seek out information at a time shortly after the
hiring of an employee is better than giving employers of "quick hires" no
incentive to do so at all.
One of the main problems with the language of the first paragraph of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 is that the statute only provides protection
when an employer supplies accurate information. 6' What does "accurate"
mean? Does this mean that the statute does not cover information that is false,
even if it was sincerely believed to be true? If so, employers in Louisiana who
make a good faith error are'not protected by this statute.
One of the prima facie elements of defamation is that the information
published is false. However, the good faith requirement of the qualified
privilege protects employers who give information reasonably believing that the
statement is true. Similar protection is provided by the malice element of
defamation. Thus, the employer is permitted to be wrong because the jurispru-
dence leaves room for an honest, reasonable mistake. Most of the other states'
shield laws do not require "accurate information," just "information."'" The
Louisiana statute should be changed from "accurate information" to "informa-
tion" to eliminate the requirement that the information be accurate. However,
163. La. R.S. 23:291 (Supp. 1998).
164. However, the Colorado, Tennessee, and Rhode Island statutes provide protection for only
"fair and unbiased information," and the Georgia statute provides protection for"factual information."
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 8-2-114 (West 1994); Ga. Code Ann. § 34-1-4 (Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code
Ann. § 50-1-105 (Supp. 1996); R.I. Gen. Laws § 28-6.4-1 (Supp. 1996).
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as the statute is written, employers should be aware that they may not be
permitted to be wrong. If the courts read the statute literally, as protecting only
accurate information, the statute affords no more protection from a claim of
defamation than the prima facie element of falsity.
Another limitation is that the statute only applies to information about an
employee's job performance or reasons for separation. Job performance is
defined to include, but is not limited to, attendance, attitude, awards, demotions,
duties, effort, evaluations, knowledge, skills, promotions, and disciplinary
actions.' Of the statutes researched, Louisiana defines with the most detail
the information protected. However, the statute leaves unclear whether
employers may give information outside of their own scope of knowledge.
Should all information regarding the employee, including information that is
second-hand and beyond the scope of the employer's personal knowledge, be
subject to the statutory shield from liability?
In Alford v. Georgia-Pacfic Corp., " the court said that in the context of
the qualified privilege, an employer, in good faith, should not be limited to facts
within his personal knowledge, but, "may, and should, pass on all information
that has come to him, regardless of whether he believes it to be true or not."
The statute seems to be more restrictive than the court was in Alford. It is
possible that the courts would consider allowing an employer to divulge potential
sources of information which would not be protected, but not the information
itself. In any case, employers should note this potential limitation on information
within the statute.
The most problematic ambiguity within the statute is whether the statute
provides any more protection than the prima facie element of malice and the
qualified immunity already provide. The prima facie element of malice, and the
good faith requirement of the qualified immunity are basically the mirror image
of each other. As noted, the element of malice is defined as the "lack of
reasonable belief in the truth of the statement."'6 7 For the situations in which
the information is defamatory per se and in which the plaintiff does not have to
prove the element of malice, the employer can still rely on the good faith
requirement of the jurisprudential qualified immunity. To be protected by the
jurisprudential qualified immunity, the employer must be in good faith, which
is defined as an honest, reasonable belief in the statement."'
The statute only protects employers who are not acting in bad faith.'69
Bad faith is proven only if the plaintiff can show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the information was knowingly false or deliberately mislead-
ing. 7° Does the statutory immunity's definition of bad faith give more
165. La. R.S. 23:291(C) (Supp. 1998).
166. 331 So. 2d 558, 562 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1976) (citing 50 Am. Jur. 2d § 273, at 791).
167. See supra discussion in Section ll.B.3.
168. See supra discussion in Section II.C.4.
169. La. R.S. 23:291(A) (Supp. 1998).
170. Id.
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protection to employers than the element of malice and the good faith require-
ment of the jurisprudential qualified immunity?
It is possible that the courts will interpret the bad faith required to defeat the
statutory immunity as more egregious than the bad faith required to prove the
prima facie element of malice or to defeat the jurisprudential qualified immunity.
Under the qualified privilege, to be in good faith the employer must reasonably
believe the statement to be true. The statutory standard could be interpreted by
the courts so as to afford the employer a little more protection, as the plaintiff
must prove not just that a reasonable person could not believe the information
to be true, but that the publication of the employer was made with deliberate
knowledge of the falsity and the intent to mislead. However, if the courts do not
make this distinction, the statute will offer no more protection to employers than
the jurisprudence already provided before the enactment of the statute.
Employers should also be aware that, as this is a Louisiana state law, the
statute would not provide immunity from federal statutory claims."7 ' The
statute would not apply to a claim by a former employee of retaliation in
violation of federal employment discrimination law.
Previously, there was a split of authority among the federal circuit courts as
to whether a former employee may bring an action claiming retaliatory
discrimination in violation of Title VII.' However, the Supreme Court
decided in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co. " that, consistent with the broader context
of Title VII and the primary purpose of the section, the term "employees," as
used in 704(a) of Title VII, includes former employees.
This is important for an employer to consider when giving employment
information to prospective employers. Consider an employee who quits her job,
then files a sex discrimination charge against her former employer. If the former
employer advises the prospective employer that the plaintiff filed a sex
discrimination charge against the former employer, it can be considered a
retaliatory act and, as such, a form of discrimination and an unlawful business
practice.' 74 Thus, Title VII protects former employees from retaliation by
employers, even if the retaliation consists of negative job references provided
after the employee has left the company, and Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291
does not provide immunity from claims brought under these laws.
Not only does the statute not provide protection from federal statutory
claims, it also does not protect employers from claims brought which are not
governed by Louisiana law. While many states have adopted shield laws, the
states that surround Louisiana have not yet done so. Employers who also employ
in other states should note that they will not be allowed to use the shield statute
if the claim is not governed by Louisiana law.
171. Landry & Hoffman, supra note 1.
172. Fields v. Phillips Sch. of Bus. & Tech., 870 F. Supp. 149 (W.D. Tex. 1994).
173. 117 S. Ct. 843, 849 (1997).
174. See Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162 (10th Cir. 1977).
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B. Section B
Distinct to Louisiana's shield law is the second section, which affords
protection to employers who reasonably rely upon information in employment
references. The second paragraph provides as follows:
B. Any prospective employer who reasonably relies on information
pertaining to an employee's job performance or reasons for separation,
disclosed by a former employer, shall be immune for civil liability
including liability for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and other
causes of action related to the hiring of said employee, based upon such
reasonable reliance, unless further investigation, including but not
limited to a criminal background check, is required by law.
This addition creates an incentive for employers to rely on employment
information and is found in no other state's shield law. It is unclear why the
legislature included this statutory protection for employers. It is possible that the
legislature reasoned that this will increase the flow of employment information
because more prospective employers, desiring the immunity, may request such
information.
Negligent hiring is difficult to prove in Louisiana. Courts will often find
that an employer did not breach the duty and acted reasonably in light of the
sensitivity of the job, or find that the employer is not liable because the harm
incurred was not within the narrowly defined scope of the risk. 7 However,
despite the apparent lack of necessity, the legislature created what seems to be
a windfall for employers who are fortunate enough to receive the requested
employment information. Even though the statute provides a great deal of
protection to employers, there are problems with the statute which may limit its
effectiveness.
The first limitation is that once an employer has employed an employee, he
is no longer considered a "prospective employer." Therefore, if he receives and
relies upon employment information after one is employed, the employer no
longer falls within the protection of the statute. The policy seems to be to
encourage employers to seek information concerning employees before exposing
co-workers and the general public to a potentially dangerous employee.
Employers should note this limitation, and realize, under a narrow interpretation,
they are only protected for relying on information received before hiring the
employee.
The next ambiguity within the statute is that the legislature did not clarify
what it means to reasonably rely on the information. Is it reasonable for an
employer to trust the employment information given concerning an employee's
job performance many years previously? Is it reasonable for an employer to rely
solely on the employment information without any other screening process? In
175. See supra discussion in Sections 11.A.2 and III.A.4.
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addition, the legislature did not address how many former employers a
prospective employer should request information from to be considered
reasonable. Until the courts adequately address this issue, employers should take
a "belt and suspenders" approach and consider the standard to be very high.
Also, the statute will only protect employers who hire based on reasonable
reliance, "unless further investigation, including but not limited to a criminal
background.check is required by law."'7  The statute does not expressly define
law. This leaves open the possibility that employers could be subject to not only
the requirements of statutory law, but also case law. As noted previously, the
jurisprudence has not provided any firm guidelines for employers to follow to
avoid liability for hiring torts. 77 If the statute is interpreted to include case
law, the statute would not provide any more protection to employers than the
jurisprudence provided before the enactment of the statute.
Another ambiguity within the statute is exactly from what claims does the
statute grant the employer immunity. The statute provides immunity from
liability for negligent hiring, negligent retention, and other causes of action
related to the hiring of said employee.' Will the courts consider vicarious
liability as one of those other causes of action related to the hiring of said
employee? The statute neither expressly denies nor grants the immunity for this
cause of action.
V. CONSEQUENCES OF THis STATUTE
Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 could potentially impose unintended
consequences on employers. The statute purports to give protection to employers
who divulge employment information. If the statute is effective, employment
information will be more readily available to prospective employers.
To determine if an employer has breached a duty of care in hiring
employees, the courts will look to the negligence of the employer at the time of
hiring. As noted, for some types of job positions, an employer must check into
the background of employees. 9 With the statute purporting to make employ-
ment information more accessible, the courts are likely to raise the standard of
"due care" for all job positions. This will typically disadvantage the small
employer who does not have the time or resources to check into every
employee's background.
Additionally, Section A of the statute might be construed to create an
affirmative duty on employers to provide employment information to prospective
employers. Some commentators argue that under the current law the best way
to protect employers, as well as the general public, is to impose an affirmative
176. La. R.S. 23:291(B) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added).
177. See supra discussion in Section II.A.2.
178. La. R.S. 23:291(B) (Supp. 1998).
179. See supra discussion in Section II1.A.2.
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duty on employers to disclose all employment information.8 0  While no
legislature has actually imposed a statutory duty to provide employment reference
information, it is possible that courts, considering the favorable view of
commentators and the perceived statutory protection for giving information,
could begin to explore whether former employers have a duty, not just a
privilege, to disclose employment information.
Section B of the statute could potentially increase the courts' opportunity to
explore this issue. The section protects current employers from claims arising
out of hiring. Practically, plaintiffs will be forced to look to other defendants,
including former employers, for relief. Thus, Section B increases the opportunity
for courts to consider, and thus the likelihood that courts will recognize, an
affirmative duty of former employers, based, in part, on Section A.
The absence of an affirmative duty in past jurisprudence stems from our tort
law's reluctance to impose an affirmative duty on individuals to take a positive
action to protect others. "The fact that the actor realizes or should realize that
action taken on his part is necessary for another's aid or protection does not itself
impose on him a duty to take such an action."'' This "no duty to rescue"
principle explains why the.courts have not yet imposed an affirmative duty on
the former employer.
In an employment reference situation, courts have generally found that an
employer has no duty to respond to a reference inquiry from a prospective
employer and disclose an applicant's unfavorable characteristics, even if those
unfavorable characteristics suggest a potential danger.'82 In perhaps the earliest
negligent referral case, Cohen v. Wales,' a New York court found that a
school district owed no duty of care when it recommended a former employee
for a position as a grammar school teacherwithout disclosing that the teacher had
been charged with sexual misconduct. The court found that because of the
absence of a special relationship, there was no duty to warn. The court stated
that the mere recommendation for a position where someone else is responsible
for the hiring is not a sufficient basis for a claim of negligence. 8 ' The court
also reasoned there was no sound policy reason warranting the expansion of the
common law duty, because the plaintiff could have an adequate remedy against
the wrongdoer and the present employer.'
In 1990, a court of appeals in Michigan faced the same issue in Moore v. St.
Joseph Nursing Home, Inc.'86 The estate of an individual who was savagely
beaten and murdered by a co-worker sued the co-worker's former employer,
alleging that the former employer was negligent in failing to disclose to a
180. See, e.g., Swerdlow, supra note 1, at 1647.
181. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1977).
182. Moore v. St. Joseph Nursing Home, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 100 (Mich. Ct. App. 1990).
183. 518 N.Y.S.2d 633 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
184. Id. at 634.
185. Id.
186. Moore, 459 N.W.2d 100.
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prospective employer the co-worker's recordof twenty-four disciplinary warnings
for acts ranging from alcohol and drug use to outright violence.' The former
employer asserted that it was never contacted by the prospective employer, but
freely admitted that had it been contacted, it would have provided no information
other than the employee's dates of employment.'" The plaintiff asserted that
the special relationship arising from the moral and social duty that gives rise to
the common law qualified privilege, which gives immunity from defamation
claims to employers who disclose employment information, should also give rise
to an affirmative duty to divulge employment information. " 9 The court agreed
that Michigan law recognizes a conditional privilege, but stated, '"[Tihere is,
however, nothing about the conditional privilege which magically transposes it
into a legal obligation requiring employers to disclose adverse information
concerning a former employee."'" The court balanced the societal interest, the
burden on the defendant, and the foreseeability of the occurrence and found that
a former employer had no duty to disclose deleterious information about a
former employee to the prospective employer. The court stated that "[a]lthough
we agree with the trial court that in today's society, with increased instances of
child abuse and other types of violence directed towards readily identifiable
classes of people, we may have reached a point where people should make this
type of information known, we restate our belief that this is a substantive change
in our law, the type of change best left to our legislature."' 9 '
Michigan's Supreme Court recently followed this reasoning in Murdock v.
Higgins.92 An infant plaintiff was sexually assaulted by an employee of the
Department of Social Services. The plaintiff filed an action against the
employee's former supervisor contending that the supervisor breached his duty
to disclose the employee's dangerous propensities respecting minors to the
Department of Social Services. The supervisor was never contacted by the
Department of Social Services. The supreme court stated that the qualified
immunity had not evolved into an affirmative duty to inform, and the court.
declined to create a new cause of action.'9
However, there may be a trend emerging in the courts to impose an
affirmative duty to inform prospective employers when the danger is foreseeable.
Recently, the California Supreme Court, in a case factually similar to Cohen,
decided that former employers may be held liable for misrepresentations relating
to the qualifications and character of employees if the statements present a
foreseeable risk of physical injury to others. In Randi W. v. Muroc Joint Unified
187. Id. at 101.
188. Id. at 102.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 102.
191. Id.
192. 559 N.W.2d 639 (Mich. 1997).
193. Id. at 644.
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School District,94 the administrator's former employers made affirmative
misrepresentations in letters by positively evaluating the administrator's character
and rapport with students without disclosing that disciplinary actions had been
taken against him for alleged sexual misconduct with students. The plaintiff, a
thirteen-year-old student in the Livingston Union School District, alleged that the
teacher had sexually molested her and that the defendant school districts knew
of the prior charges of repeated sexual improprieties of the teacher.'95
The plaintiff did not claim a special relationship with the defendants; thus,
the court used general negligence principles to determine if a duty existed. 9
First, the court considered the foreseeability and causality of the defendant's
actions and the plaintiff's injury. Although admitting the chain of causation from
the defendant's statements to the alleged assault was attenuated, the court decided
that the injury was reasonably foreseeable and a "direct and proximate result" of
the misrepresentations.' 97 Second, the court found that the unreserved recom-
mendations together with the failure to disclose facts reasonably necessary to
minimize child molestation could be characterized as morally blameworthy.'9s
Next, the court discussed the possible courses of conduct that the plaintiff could
have utilized to avoid tort liability.'99 Last, the court balanced the public
policy considerations. The defendants argued that a duty to give all employment
information should not be imposed, because this would make employers hesitate
in giving any employment information."ro However, the court was more
impressed with the plaintiff's observation that the employer would not cease
giving information, because California's shield law20' would protect former
employers. 2
Thus, the court held, consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts
sections 3 10 and 3 11, that a duty did exist to refrain from misrepresenting the
quality or character of the employee."0 3 The court then determined that the
194. 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997).
195. Id. at 585.
196. Id. at 588.
197. Id. at 589.
198. Id. at 589.
199. Id. The court suggested the alternative courses available: (I) writing a letter of full
disclosure revealing all facts; (2) writing a "no comment" letter omitting any affirmative
representations; or (3) merely verifying basic employment dates and details.
200. Id. at 589-90.
201. Cal. Civ. Code § 47(c) (West Supp. 1997).
202. Randi W., 929 P.2d at 590-91.
203. Id. at 593. Section 310 concerns intentional conduct and provides that
An actor who makes a misrepresentation is subject to liability to another for physical
harm which results from an act done by the other or a third person in reliance upon the
truth of the representation, if the actor
(a) intends his statement to induce or should realize that it is likely to induce action by
the other, or a third person, which involves an unreasonable risk of harm to the other, and
(b) knows
(i) that the statement is false, or
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letters did consist of "misrepresentations" or "false information" within the
meaning of Sections 310 and 311 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. ' " The
court concluded that the unqualified recommendation of the employee for any
position constituted affirmative representations that were false and misleading in
light of the defendants' alleged knowledge of charges of repeated sexual
improprieties. Ultimately, the court held that these "half-truths" could invoke an
exception to the general rule excluding liability for mere non-disclosure or other
failure to act.205
Another critical issue decided by the court in Randi W. concerns whether a
third party may have a claim for negligent referral. The court stated that even
though the defendant made no misrepresentations directly to the plaintiff, who
probably neither knew of nor relied upon the misrepresentations, the plaintiff was
nevertheless protected in accordance with the Restatement principles.'" Thus,
not only employers and their employees, but third parties as well, may bring a
claim for negligent referral.
Another case which is indicative of the growth in successful negligent
referral claims is Jerner v. Allstate Insurance Co.07 In this highly-publicized
Florida case, ten families of persons killed, as well as two co-workers injured by
their co-worker's gunfire, filed suit against the employee's former employer,
Allstate, for allegedly failing to disclose negative aspects in an employment
reference.0 ' The suit alleges that a letter, provided to the employee by
Allstate, stated that his departure was not related to job performance.'"
However, the employee was really fired because of his unstable condition and
frequent possession of a firearm in the workplace."
(ii) that he has not the knowledge which he professes.
Section 311 involves negligent conduct and provides:
(I) One who negligently gives false information to another is subject to liability for
physical harm cased by action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such
information, where such harm results
(a) to the other, or
(b) to such third persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken.
(2) Such negligence may consist of failure to exercise reasonable care
(a) in ascertaining the accuracy of the information, or
(b) in the manner in which it is communicated.
204. Id. at 593.
205. Id. at 593.
206. Id.
207. Jemer v. Allstate Ins. Co., Fla. Cir. Ct. No. 93-09472 Div. F order 8/10/95.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. It is alleged that Allstate provided the letter for the employee's use with future employers
so that the unstable employee would not become angry at Allstate over his termination. It is also
alleged that Allstate was aware of the fact that Calden had made threats against other people as well
as other bizarre actions such as telling people in the office that he could not be photographed because
he was from another planet, devil worship on his personal computer, and threatening behavior toward
female staff members.
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When the judge allowed the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to include
Allstate as a defendant and to conduct discovery concerning punitive damages,
the parties reached a confidential settlement. While nothing was actually decided
by the court, the judge's allowance of the amendment and the discovery seems
to indicate the trend that courts will be more willing to accept the tort of
negligent referral.
The Randi W. and Jerner cases involve situations in which an employer was
asked for and made affirmative representations regarding a former employee's
reason for termination. The reasoning behind these decisions may also influence
a court's decision in a case in which the employer knows of the potential danger
of an employee, yet gives only name, salary, and dates of employment. In light
of the statutory immunity, the court could take this reasoning to the next level
and impose a duty on employers to provide requested information if the
employee presents a foreseeable risk. The possible trend in recognizing an
affirmative duty would have a significant impact on employers who would
otherwise give letters stating that there was no problem just to avoid defamation
litigation. No longer would employers be safe behind the walls of"no comment"
references if the employee is potentially dangerous and the employer knows this.
Even though an attorney involved in the Jerner case felt that it was more the
fraud aspect of the case than the duty-to-warn aspect that drove the punitive
damages, 1' employers should note the potential for this trend to develop and
thus give all information if danger is foreseeable.
Employers in Louisiana should be very cautious in this regard. So far, only
one case involving a negligent referral has been reported in Louisiana. In
Francioni v. Rault, 12 an employee was forced to resign from Masonite after
it was discovered that he had embezzled funds. After his termination, he was
suspected of attempting to kill a Masonite employee. Plaintiffs alleged that
Masonite misrepresented the employee's history and knowingly placed third
persons at risk.2"3 The court found that Masonite did not breach a duty, as the
employee had manifested no homicidal tendencies at the time of his resigna-
tion.21 4 The court found that the duty to furnish employment information to
interested parties did not encompass the risk that he would murder his co-worker
at a subsequent job, as there was no "ease of association" between the negligence
and the harm.2" '
The court in Francioni v. Rault only concluded that Masonite did not have
a duty to protect the company, its employees, or the public at large from the
211. Workplace Violence: Allstate Insurance Settles Lawsuit Connected to the 1993 Shooting
Deaths, BNA Employment Policy and Law Daily, Oct. 6, 1995.
212. 518 So. 2d 1175 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 521 So. 2d 1189 (1989).
213. Id. at 1176. EDP 'Personnel Services made a call to Masonite's personnel department to
verify only the employee's dates of employment.
214. Id. at 1177.
215. Id.
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unforeseeable violent acts of the employee. 6 However, had the employee
been forced to resign for acts of violence, instead of embezzlement, it is possible
that the court would have found the necessary "ease of association" and found
that Masonite was negligent. Considering the increasing number of negligent
referral cases in other jurisdictions, the new shield law, and the foundation
already found in Francioni v. Rault, it seems at least possible that Louisiana
courts could follow the same reasoning as the California Supreme Court, and
heighten the duty imposed on employers in giving references.
Louisiana courts should consider imposing an affirmative duty on employers
to provide accurate employment information if requested to do so and a
foreseeable danger is present. The purpose of the statute is to increase the free
flow of truthful employment information. Since the statute provides an
immunity for employers who divulge employment information, it would seem to
be a windfall if employers were not required by an affirmative duty to prevent
a foreseeable danger in exchange for the statutory immunity.
VI. SUGGESTIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM
To improve the employment reference situation by increasing the flow of
employment information, the Louisiana Legislature created Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:291. The statute dangles the carrot of immunity from liability to
entice employers to make this type of information available and also to seek such
information. However, the statute has many flaws that might prevent the statute
from becoming an effective tool for employers. The legislature should consider
the following suggestions for reform so that the statute is less ambiguous and
more effective.
First, the legislature should alter the request requirement found in Section
A. At present the statute only gives immunity for statements made upon
request.217 As noted, this would create the dilemma of not protecting a former
employer who feels a moral duty to volunteer information."'e The legislature
should alter the request requirement so that it reads: "the information must be
requested unless the employer divulging the information has a compelling
interest." The addition of the volunteer with the compelling interest would give
employers the same protection as the jurisprudential qualified immunity.
The legislature should also consider eliminating the requirement that the
information given be "accurate information." 219 Under a literal interpretation
of this language, employers are not permitted to make an honest mistake. As
written, the statute affords no more protection than the prima facie element of
216. Id.
217. See supra discussion in Section IV.A.
218. See supra discussion in Section IV.A.
219. See supra discussion in Section IV.A.
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falsity. Hence, the legislature should change "accurate information" to just
"information."
In addition, the legislature should clearly define in Section B what it means
to "reasonably rely" on employment information. 2 0 The statute gives employ-
ers no more guidance than the jurisprudence concerning hiring torts already
provides.
The legislature should also consider changing the phrase found in Section B
concerning investigation. The statute states that the employer is given protection,
"unless further investigation, including but not limited to a criminal background
check, is required by law.",22' The employer is left unsure if the statute defines
"law" as statutory law or case law. If the statute refers to case law, employers
are left with few firm guidelines. The legislature should amend the exception
to state that it means only those investigations required by statutory law.
In addition, the legislature should amend the statute to include a clause that
would provide that the statute is the exclusive remedy and is not supplemental
to any protections that are already afforded employers under state law. If the
suggested amendments are made, the statute would be an accurate codified
expression of the jurisprudential qualified immunity and thus the jurisprudential
immunity would no longer be needed. This would allow a unified body of case
law to develop in this area of the law, in that the parties must use the statutory
protections and immunities to the exclusion of the former case law.222
However, even if the legislature resolves the ambiguities within the statute
so as to make it an accurate expression of the current jurisprudence, the problem
of employers giving "no comment" references will still not be remedied. A
statute which affords no more protection to employers than the qualified
immunity will not encourage employers to give honest employment information.
More often than not, employers refuse to give employment references not only
because they fear defamation liability, but also because they wish to avoid the
costs associated with defending themselves in defamation suits. 22  Thus, to
truly meet the goal of persuading employers to provide honest employment
information, the statute should provide a financial defense.
As the system is now, litigants are responsible for their attorney fees. Thus,
an employer will generally be obligated to pay significant fees to attorneys if
forced to defend its reference practices, even if the employer is ultimately
successful.2  While the other state's "shield laws" surveyed did not contain a
provision to shift costs to the loser, the original version of Louisiana Revised
Statutes 23:2912. did contain such a "loser pays" provision; however, it was
deleted before the bill was enacted into law.
220. See supra discussion in Section IV.A.
221. See supra discussion in Section IV.B.
222. See supra discussion in Section IV.B.
223. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 140.
224. Saxon, supra note 1, at 99.
225. Original Senate Bill No. 68S, La. Reg. Session 1995.
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The deleted provision provided that an employer prevailing in an action for
defamation, invasion of privacy, negligent hiring, negligent retention, or other
related causes of action shall be entitled to reasonable damages, reasonable
attorney fees and court costs incurred only if the cause of action is "deemed
frivolous, meritless, or brought for malicious purpose." 2 6 While the author of
the original bill was aiming in the right direction, the language of the proposed
law was too ambiguous to hit the mark. It would have engendered more
litigation, as a disgruntled employee, who is just trying to "get even" with a
former employer, will appeal a judgment that his or her claim is a "frivolous"
claim against a former employer. Instead, the legislature should follow the
suggestion of a scholarly commentator and enact a provision which would allow
the prevailing defendant employer to recover attorney fees if the unfavorable
employment reference was substantially true and not false in any material
way.2" The statute would remain the same in that the defendant employer
may not recover attorney fees just because the reference was within the bounds
of the qualified privilege.2 In a case in which an employer made a statement
which was false, but fell within the bounds of the qualified privilege, the litigants
would be responsible for their own litigation expenses. 29
The original bill also provided for costs for the prevailing plaintiff in such
an action. The original statute provided that the prevailing party, alleging that
the information disclosed or reasonably relied upon by an employer was
knowingly false, deliberately misleading, and disclosed for malicious purpose
shall be entitled to an award for reasonable damages, reasonable attorney fees
and court costs incurred as a result of the claim. 230 One commentator suggests
that the plaintiff should only recover costs if the factfinder finds that the
defendant disseminated false and derogatory reference information and, in so
doing, the plaintiff abused the qualified privilege that would normally protect
reference communications.2 '
As there are disadvantages, such as possible overdeterrence, it is arguable
that the benefits greatly outweigh the disadvantages.232 The primary advantage
would be to further achieve the goal of encouraging employers to adopt a policy
of giving honest' employment references.233 Employers would not have to fear
paying significant attorney fees to defend their reference practices for cases that
are substantially true.
226. Original Senate Bill No. 688, La. Reg. Session 1995.
227. Saxon, supra note 1, at 100.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Original Senate Bill No. 688, La. Reg. Session 1995.
231. Saxon, supra note 1, at 100.
232. For general discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of the loser-pays provisions,
see Saxon, supra note 1, at 101-07.
233. Saxon, supra note I, at 104.
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Second, the "loser pays" provision would create a strong incentive for both
the plaintiff and the defendant to avoid insupportable litigation. 3 , Employers
who have defamed an employee outside of the qualified privilege would be
hesitant to force litigation over a former employee's claim if the employer was
required to pay his own litigation fees as well as the employee's. As well, the
prevailing litigant would be more fully and fairly compensated. 5 Prevailing
employers would not have to pay the cost of defending. As well, the plaintiffs
would be more fully compensated as their damage awards would not be
diminished by the cost of litigation.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is yet unknown if Louisiana's new law will significantly affect the tug-of-
war between former employers and prospective employers. 236 It will be
interesting to see how the courts will interpret the ambiguities in the statute.
However, until the law is tested in the courts, employers should be aware of the
limitations and provide employment information accordingly.
It is also unclear if Louisiana courts will move toward the trend of recogniz-
ing more negligent referral claims. If so, considering the recent developments
in the law, those giving employment information should not limit the information
given to strictly positive evaluations. The immunity from torts associated with
hiring given to employers by the statute will cause plaintiffs to seek out new
defendants. Thus, the courts will have more opportunities to explore the tort of
negligent hiring. In light of the statutory protection, and the trend in some
jurisdictions to recognize these claims, it is possible that courts will take the
reasoning to the next level and find that an employer not only has a duty to not
misrepresent employment information, but also a duty to divulge all employment
information. Therefore, employers and former employers would be best advised
to divulge all information concerning job performance that is necessary to
prevent a foreseeable danger. Employers should be aware that a "no comment"
reference is not as safe as once thought.
To make Louisiana Revised Statutes 23:291 a more accurate reflection of the
case law, the legislature should consider the suggested changes to the language
of the statute that would clarify the ambiguities within. However, having a
statute which merely reflects the prior jurisprudence is not going to give an
incentive to employers to give honest employment references. The legislature
should consider enacting the suggested "loser pays" and exclusivity provisions.
The exclusivity provision would serve to create a unified body of law in this area
that would provide useful guidelines to employers and employees. The proposed
234. Id. at 104, 105.
235. Id. at 105.
236. Landry & Hoffman, supra note I, at 457.
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"loser pays" rule would create the desired effect of encouraging Louisiana
employers to provide honest employment information more freely.
Jennifer L. Aaron

